vade the shores of Japan. Theoretically such an attack could be executed by thrusts from two directions: 1) from the North, from Alaska, by way of Kamchatka in the southern Arctic Ocean down to northern Manchuria; b) from the South, through a landing on the coast of the South China Sea, (French Indo-China), and then into South and Central China. But both of these plans are bound up with tremendous hazards that the troops, transport, etc. may be sunk—and this contradiction between the economically aggressive role of American imperialism, and its military-strategic possibilities, determines the attitude of the United States towards China.
The United States has an interest in the rising of a more or less powerful State in eastern Asia, capable of challenging Japan for the domination of the Asiatic peoples of the Far East. Hence the "neutral" watchful-waiting attitude of the United States towards the military struggles now taking place in China. If the worst comes to the worst the United States is even ready to make a settlement with a victorious Canton Government, since the practical Yankees weigh the perspectives of the Chinese revolution from a business standpoint.
When the armed struggle is ended and the unification of China accomplished, and there enters the phase of economic construction, then the U. S. S. R. will be the only State honestly ready to support the economic resurrection of China. Yet the Americans assume that the U. S. 8. R. will for a long time be unable to come to the aid of the Chinese working masses on the economic field. The American imperialists are of the opinion that then their hour will have come. The workers and peasants of China will be compelled by force of circumstances to introduce the "American NEP.", and then it will be easy for the United States to make itself master of China. But once American imperialism has taken economic root in China, it will
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