without qualification; but it must always be an objective judgment—i.e., a judgment on the conduct of aman in its relation to others, not an absolute judgment on the moral value of the man himself.
II. The second charge is a far graver one, and there is, alas! less to be said in Cranmer's defence. Still, it is less than it appears to us of the present day, when we look at it in the light—or the darkness, I should perhaps better say—of the times in which he lived. Of Henry's three divorces, the circumstances were all different. In regard to the first, and most important—that from Katherine of Arragon—there is no doubt whatever that it was defensible, and that Cranmer believed it was right. The question of Anne Boleyn's guilt or innocence is one which most historians, of late years, have given up as insoluble; but if any man really knew the rights of the question at the time, Cranmer was that man.
The divorce of Anne of Cleves seems to have been, on the King's side, the most groundless and inexcusable of all; but it must be conceded, as far as the judge is concerned, that she herself appears to have concurred in it.[1] Thus, if we take the charges against Cranmer of having violated justice in deference to the royal wishes, we shall find ourselves compelled, so to speak, to grant him an acquittal in two out of the three, and a verdict of not proven in that of Anne Boleyn. Now, when we take into consideration the fact so often referred to, that in Tudor times to be prosecuted by the Crown was practically equivalent to being condemned, and that the only two men who openly stood out against Henry's will were More and Fisher, both of whom lost their heads in consequence, we can hardly be surprised that any man should object to doing the same in a doubtful case.
- ↑ Oughton, Ordo judiciorum, p. 320.
