certain. His references to the change at the time, are slight,[1] but they seem to imply satisfaction. Even in later years, when he had himself suffered from the unbridled power of a tribune, he contended, though somewhat faintly, that Pompey was justified in his policy.[2] He urges that, though the power of the tribune is doubtless excessive, yet "the violence of the people is a force yet more savage by far and more uncontrollable, and this is sometimes under greater restraint, if it has a leader, than if it has none; for the leader considers that he advances at his own peril, whereas the popular impulse takes no account of danger." "Pompey," he continues, "was bound to have regard not only to what was most desirable, but to what was necessary. It was the part of a wise citizen not to leave to some pestilent demagogue the credit of a measure, which was not so very dangerous in itself, and which was too popular to be resisted."
But if Cicero were dubious or neutral in respect of this portion of the programme of the opposition, it was far otherwise when he dealt with the reform of the jury-courts. Here he was heart and soul with the order from whose ranks he had sprung. He felt that it was a mere mockery of responsibility to bring corrupt governors before a bench of their peers, who were too often their accomplices. It was easier indeed to point out the faults of the present system than to provide a remedy. Pompey's
