given it their support they could not have saved it this alone must show the irrational nature of the present agitation. Nor has the history of the measure in the House of Commons been more intelligently significant of a mature opinion in its favour. It was first proposed in 1842, but rejected by 123 to 100. In 1849 it was read a second time by 177 to 143, but lost in Committee. In 1850 it was again read a second time by 182 to 130. In 1855, the majority on the second reading was 164 to 157. In 1858, the majority on the second reading was 176 to 134. In 1859, the numbers were 136 to 77. In 1861 the second reading was lost by 177 to 172. In 1862 it passed by 144 to 133, but was rejected on the motion that the Speaker do leave the chair by 148 to 116. In 1866 it was rejected by 174 to 154. In 1869 it passed the second reading by 243 to 144. but was afterwards lost in Committee. In 1870 it passed into Committee by 184 to 114. This year the majority in the Commons was 125 to 84, or only 41, and on the proposal to abolish the retrospective clause for which the promoters principally care, the majority was only 35. It is therefore without the slightest foundation in fact that the advocates of the measure speak of its rejection by the Lords as "in the face of increasing majorities in the Commons.""
The first sounds of the conflict at Home, whose history is thus summarized, have at length reached us. The notes of opposition have been heard in our Synod; the glove has been thrown down in even a Church Newspaper, which has strangely admitted a series of arguments against the Church's law by the principle breaker of that law in this country—no less a person than the President of the Wesleyan Conference! while not a word of reply has appeared since. The general contempt for religious as opposed to secular law which characterizes the looseness of Colonial populations, and our familiarity with the tremendous laxness of the Marriage Laws of the United States, must, in the nature of things, precipitate a struggle between the Church and the World at no distant day; while it is to be deeply deplored that the law of Ontario appears so very dubious as to invite wilful persons to contract alliances which not even it, any more than the Divine Law, approves. The case seems to be this, according to the fullest judgment of our Courts: The marriage of a man with a deceased wife's sister stands good, and the issue legitimate, if no objection is made ab extra, by a third party, during their life-time: otherwise, that is, in case of objection, the union is invalid, the issue illegitimate. Of course, too, the will of either of the parties dissolves the union.[1] And we are told that this is a marriage? and that the law of the Church is against the law of the land! Surely it is utterly ridiculous to call that union a marriage, either from a legal or a Christian point of view, which depends on the
- ↑ *Vid. the decision of V.C.Esten, Chanc'y Reports: (Grant's) Vol. ix.p. 305. The Law as I have since observed, is not dubious, and gives very little encouragement to these incestuous unions. The reason why a marriage "void" " unlawful" and "voidable" at the time of its contracting and during the lives of both parties to it, could not be "avoided" after the death of either, is thus stated by the V.C:—"After the death of either of the parties the temporal courts, which have no jurisdiction themselves, and must regard every marriage de facto, as good until it is declared void by the ecclesiastical courts, will not permit them to declare the marriage void after the death of one of the parties, whom their sentence can have no effect on the marriage itself, it being already dissolved by death, and its only effect will be to bastardize the issue. The result is, that after the death of the parties, the marriage is valid and the issue legitimate de facto, but not de jure." This is said as to England and Scotland; but as to the case before the V. C., he goes on to say, "It must be recognized as a marriage de facto by the temporal courts until annulled by sentence of the Ecclesiastical courts, which could only be done during the life-time of both parties to it. But this is clearly the law of this province. It cannot be doubted that the marriage in question in this case was unlawful and void at the time of its celebration, and could have been annulled by the sentence of the Ecclesiastical court at any time during the life-time of both parties. But it is equally clear that, it never having been so annulled it has become indissoluble, and the children springing from it are to all practical purposes absolutely legitimate."
