and at other times, of unnecessary and prolonged operations, and too often of losses to worn-out troops from exposure and disease.
Such was the termination of the series of operations before Lucknow, which lasted about twenty days, with a loss of 19 officers and 608 men killed, wounded, and missing. By the end of March the British army was broken up, and a complete redistribution was effected. It had been intended by the Viceroy that the re-conquest of Rohilkhand should follow the re-taking of Lucknow, and the hoped-for capture of its rebel garrison; but the plan of the campaign was now necessarily changed. Immediate action of some kind was requisite on account of the escape of the rebels. The Commander-in-Chief was anxious to restrict operations for the moment to the clearing of the country around Lucknow. He desired to postpone an advance into Rohilkhand till the autumn. But Lord Canning would not hear of this; and indeed it seemed impossible to remain thus inactive without considerable risk.
Immediate action, both in Rohilkhand and in Oudh, was therefore resolved on; and as the rapid movements of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India during the period culminating in the capture of Jhánsí, in April, had freed the Commander-in-Chief from any special anxiety in that direction, he was enabled to turn his individual attention to those two provinces. Though disorganised, and to some extent demoralised, the rebels were resolved not to surrender at discretion, and it became imperative that no time should be lost
