tually man, and every other species of animal either existing or that may exist : But the genus animal is contained in man, and in other animals actually ; for man cannot exist without being in actuality, and not potentially only an animal."[1]
If we have recourse to Dr. Gillies for a little more light upon this question, we shall meet with a similar disappointment. According to him, the meaning of the phrases in question is to he sought for in the following definition of Aristotle:- "To say that one thing is contained in another, is the same as saying that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its signification, when there is no particular denoted by the subject, to which the predicate does not apply."[2] In order, therefore, to make sure of Aristotle's idea, we must substitute the definition instead of the thing defined, that is,
- ↑ Ancient Metaphysics, vol. iv. p. 73. For the distinction betwixt containing potentially and actually, Lord Monboddo acknowledges himself indebted to a Greek author then living, Eugenius Diaconus.—(Anc. Met. vol. iv. p. 73.) Of this author -we are elsewhere told, that he was a Professor in the Patriarch's University at Constantinople ; and that he published, in pure Attic Greek, a system of logic, at Leipsic, in the year 1766- (Origin and Progress of Language, vol. i. p. 45, 2d edit.) It is an extraordinary circumstance, that a discovery on which, in Lord Monboddo's opinion, the whole truth of the syllogism depends, should have been of so very recent a date. [It was, how-ever, very old, and quite common.—Ed.]
- ↑ Gillios's Aristotle, vol. i. p. 73. "This remark," says Dr. Gillies, " which is the foundation of all Aristotle's logic, has been sadly mistaken by many. Among others. Dr. Reid accuses Aristotle of using as synonymous phrases, the being in a subject, and the being truly predicated of a subject ; whereas the truth is, that, according to Aristotle, the meaning of the one phrase is directly the reverse of the meaning of the other." Ibid. "While I readily admit the justness of this criticism on Dr. Reid, I must take the liberty of adding, that I consider Reid's error as a mere oversight, or slip of the pen. That he might have accused Aristotle of confounding two things which, although different in fact, had yet a certain degree of resemblance or affinity, is by no means impossible ; but it is scarcely conceivable that he could be so careless as to accuse him of confounding two things which he invariably states in direct opposition to each other. I have not a doubt, therefore, that Reid's idea was that Aristotle used, as synonymous phrases, the being in a thing, and the being a subject of which that thing can be truly predicated ; more especially, as either statement would equally well have answered his purpose. [But Reid was quite right. Gillies wholly wrong. See Reid's Collected Works, p. 681.—Ed.]
