WORLD WAR 449 WORLD WAR German military leaders considered that numerical superiority, when not too great, would be discounted by the su- perior German system of railways and the advantages that followed from the fact that the Germans were fighting on interior lines and that the Allies were fighting on exterior lines. During the winter months fighting on any large scale was impossible on the western front and the early period of the year saw little more than a succes- sion of trench attacks and raids for pur- poses of reconnoitering. These recipro- cal raids went on along the entire front, sometimes preceded by bombardment, but more often made as surprise attacks in the course of the night or early morning. The Germans usually showed the initiative and it was evidently the intention to try the weak points of the Allied line in preparation for the great spring drive that was to follow. On the other hand the Allied forces were not active. They knew that strong con- centrations were being made behind the German front, and their raids and at- tacks were in the main directed to the purpose of discovering the points at which the concentrations were being made. Aviators were active on both sides supplementing the reconnoitering activities of the forces on the ground. Early in the year also trained Amer- ican troops were in condition that per- mitted them to take over a section of the front. They had received their fin- ishing drill in camps near Nancy and Toul, and it was decided that when the time came they could do their best work at the St. Mihiel salient, which had re- mained substantially unchanged since the Germans took up their position in the vicinity in 1914. The line taken up by the United States forces ran along Apremont and Flirey and Remeneauville. Their baptism of fire came very readily as soon as one or two raids had shown the Germans whom they had opposite them. On March 21 the Germans let loose the powerful blow on the western front to which such deliberate preparation had been given. Its success shows that it was inspired by principles of sound strategy, which aims at the weakest point in the opposing forces. The blow fell in the main on the British and par- ticularly at the point where the French and British forces were in contact and the aim was to strike suddenly with ir- resistible power, break through, isolate the British from the French, roll the former armies up against the Channel ports and, if possible, give them the al- ternative of surrender or of being driven into the sea. It was then intended to turn southward and attack the French and so make a second onslaught on Paris. The blow almost succeeded. Had. it been possible for the Germans to put their complete plan into operation they might have succeeded in offsetting even the great superiority in numbers with which the United States was already be- ginning to endow the Allies. But for complete success even in its preliminary stage a passage so pronounced had to be cut that German forces might be able to reach Amiens and the coast. This is where the German blow fell short. A broad gap was hewn through the British forces at the point of junction %vith the French forces and day succeeded day while the news went round the world that British regiments were being anni- hilated and the Germans were marching to the sea almost without further op- position. The line selected for attack wa3 between Marcoing, near Cambrai, and the Oise river, and was defended by the British Fifth Army, under General Gough, having been a portion of the line formerly held by the French. It was powerfully fortified and might have been held under ordinary circumstances by forces inferior to those attacking. Its defensive positions consisted of an out- post line, a resistance line, and behind these the battle line proper where the most powerful resistance could be put up. The arrangement of the outposts made it possible to pour a strong enfilad- ing fire on the Germans as soon as they had passed the outpost line. The advance began a short time before five o'clock in the morning when the fog hung over the battlefield. The British had had forewarning of the advance and had made preparations to meet it, but the impetuosity of the attack upset the plans of defense. The outpost line was in German hands almost before the Brit- ish knew that the attack had been launched. The resistance line went al- most as easily as the first line of de- fense, and the only real fight occurred at the third or battle system of defense. The British divisions manning the sys- tem were ultimately scattered by the on- rushing Germans who drove forward through the tremendous gap cut into the British Fifth Army, and with a gigantic plunge directed their advance along the road to Amiens. The German advance henceforth looked as though it was about to carry every- thing before it. The attack had a Na- poleonic unerringness and completion of plan, and only because the object ainved at required an almost superhuman strength to achieve had it fallen short
