Page:Collier's New Encyclopedia v. 10.djvu/521

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WORLD WAR 461 WORLD WAR driven back to points near the coast the accidental positions in which they found themselves were on elevated ground from which they could overlook the Ger- man lines and bombard them with ac- curacy. The task before the Germans was to broaden the salient by a renewed advance, and this they attempted to do. The initial success, however, could not be repeated. Their positions were not so favorable, nor could a similar process of preparation be gone through. The at- tacks and counter-attacks went on through April, but the Germans did not succeed in pushing their positions nearer the coast. Nevertheless, the battle of Picardy, while not achieving the evident purpose of driving a wedge as far as the coast, was a huge German success. The Germans took over 90,000 prisoners, 1,- 300 guns, and 100 tanks. They retook all the ground they held previous to the first battle of the Somme and in addi- tion something like 1,500 square miles. And from the point of view of the Allies the blow fell just short of disaster. The battle of Picardy and the second battle of the Somme showed that there was something radically wrong in the organization of the Allied armies. The confidence that had hitherto inspired them was badly shaken, and all recog- nized that they had been saved by a very narrow margin from events that might have changed the whole face of the war. In the face of the general demoralization and almost total eclipse into which they had fallen they were prepared to adopt measures which had formerly appeared distasteful, but which were now seen to be necessary. The most important step to be taken was to ap- point a single commander-in-chief for all the Allied armies. The British General Staff was opposed to the move, but the British public appeared to be in favor of it. President Wilson had also argued for a unified command, and General Per- shing had shown readiness to put the American forces in France at the dis- posal of the Allies. In the end General Foch was named commander-in-chief of all the Allied forces in the field. Sub- sequent events showed the move to be a wise one. Meanwhile the Germans were seeking to follow up their success before Amiens with another advance which would re- lieve the pressure on their attenuated forces in that region and help them fur- ther in their effort to reach the coast. As a result of these calculations they suddenly began to attack between the elevated ground N. of Ypres and Arras. The intention in this case was to drive a wedge between the British forces at Ypres and the British forces at Arrag, repeating the operation that had been attended with so much success farther S. Had there been an equally successful advance in this break through, it was clear that Calais and the other channel ports would have fallen, with incalcu- lable results to the British. On April 9th the Germans captured Richebourg, St. Vaast and Laventie, creating a gap of about three miles in the British lines through which they drove in large num- bers. On the following day they crossed the river Lys and attacked the base of Messines Ridge, capturing the village and forest of Ploegsteert, as well as Armentieres. Attacking from La Bassee to the Ypres-Comines canal they took Estaires and Steenwerck. On the 12th they were within five miles of Haze- brouck and it looked again as if the British line was to be smashed to pieces. It was on this occasion that General Haig issued the appeal to his troops: "With our backs to the wall and believ- ing in the justice of our cause, each of us must fight to the end." General Haig's statement appeared on the 12th, but the German attack went forward * and on the 17th they captured Poelcap- pelle, Langemarck, and Passchendaele, long held by the British. The reorgan- ized British made an attempt to retake Messines Ridge on the 17th, but the only result was that they were driven back in hopeless confusion, so that their posi- tions on the 18th were almost co-termi- nous with those held by them before the battle of Ypres in 1914. The blow to British self-confidence and pride was felt keenly, for the terrible succession of failures and flights appeared to show that the Germans could strike at will on any part of the British front in the certainty of victory. On the 19th, how- ever, French reserves were brought up and their support put new courage and strength into the British lines. The German blows were far from spent, however, and on the 27th, Mount Kemrnel, the remaining key to the Ypres salient, fell to them after bloody fight- ing in which the British, supported by the French, were driven beyond the vil- lages of Kemmel and Dranoutre. French gallantry showed up conspicuously in this battle, in which hundreds of poilus refused to budge and preferred death at their posts to retreat. The fighting in the region continued to the middle of May, in its last phases resulting in gain and loss of territory to both sides. The second great German thrust resulted in the occupation of about 800 square miles of territory held by the British and some Portuguese. However, the coast was not