foundest statesman of Europe. He was, at the time, in the calmest period of his political life. He had decided to be Emperor of France and to dictate to Europe. He was then revolving in his mind the steps to be taken. He was preparing for war with England. Should he yield this purpose to plans which could be successful only by peace with England? Just at this time threats reached his ear of the prospect of war from America, if he attempted to occupy New Orleans. Fortunately these threats came in a form not to arouse his pride but to warn his judgment.
The party which had, when in power, shown hostility to France and friendship for England were now, as a minority party, urging the United States to steps which must involve war with France. This party had been, for the time, restrained by the party in power, who were recognized as friendly to France. The government of the United States had made no arrogant demands. The resident minister, Mr. Livingston, under instructions from a friendly President, had assiduously urged that the Mississippi river should be made the boundary line between Louisiana and the United States, but had shown cogent and friendly reasons for the request, and had manifested no desire to acquire the entire province. The whole matter had come before Napoleon in the best possible form, and at the best possible time. He needed money for the approaching war with England, and he needed, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of the United States. His decision was made. With characteristic impetuosity he proceeded to put his plans into execution.[1]
The world is indebted to M. Barbe Marbois, the agent
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- ↑ The reader is referred to Marbois’ History of Louisiana, and also to the admirable work of Hon Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana Spanish Domination. This latter work contains instructive discussion of the events and negotiations connected with the cession. The English view of Napoleon’s motives may be found in Alison s History of England, vol. 8, pp. 280-282.
