in his fixed purposes. He marked out for his country during the trying period which convulsed Europe, the most judicious course possible to pursue. While the statesmen of Europe were daily making disastrous mistakes, Jefferson might be accorded the post of honor if he made but one. If the embargo was a mistake, which is by no means certain, the mistake consisted in over estimating the willingness of all the sections to submit to temporary sacrifices for the best interests of their country. After the resistance of the mercantile sections had been demonstrated, the embargo was repealed. It may not have been as good a recourse as war, but it was better than submission. It wrought no permanent disaster. What injury it caused has been greatly exaggerated for party purposes. It produced some permanent benefits. The course of those who resisted it was less patriotic than the course of those who enacted it.
This persistence in the policy of neutrality with the European powers, while all Europe was at war, rendered Jefferson and his diplomatists unpopular in European courts. They came to be regarded with jealousy, as seeking to pick up advantages from the quarrels of other nations. This jealousy was inflamed By the efforts to acquire Florida, and by the wonderful growth of the American merchant marine, which thrived on European wars and American neutrality.
Jefferson, Madison and Monroe,, the exponents of this policy, endeavored to promote this growth by" preserving peace. When it was unjustly assailed by European aggression, they tried to protect it with the shield rather than the sword. This course subjected them to the sneers and sarcasm of foreign courts, courtiers and writers. Such taunts are not surprising from European sources. Europe was intoxicated, and hurled the reproaches which persons in such condition are accustomed to visit upon those who decline to take part in their excesses. It is not surprising that political adversaries at
