The whole nation is happy. The administration is vindicated. Spared even the trial of a painful interview with disaffected fellow citizens, James Madison may now enjoy the serene satisfaction so congenial to his nature and so nobly earned.
The opportune close of the war left the United States surrounded with a halo of glory. America had won honor on land and sea. Her naval victories had demonstrated to Europe that Great Britain was not invincible on the ocean. Her persistent adherence to a neutral policy had disarmed European jealousy, and had given the hint to Russia that it might be useful to cultivate the friendship of a growing nation of vast resources, which had already shown the ability and the disposition to curb Great Britain’s arbitrary control of the ocean, and from whose pacific character Europe had nothing to fear.
The foundation of friendship with Russia had been laid in 1810 by the successful diplomatic mission so ably conducted by John Quincy Adams. It had been prevented from bearing immediate fruits by the war which was precipitated by Napoleon, and which had united against him all the great powers of Europe. The United States had become involved in war with Great Britain, and occupied the position of being indirectly the ally of Napoleon. Russia was the temporary ally, but the permanent enemy of Great Britain. As soon as Napoleon was overthrown, the emperor of Russia began to cultivate friendly relations with America. In March, 1813, he offered his services to mediate a treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States. This offer was declined by Great Britain, but led to proposals from Great Britain to treat directly with the United States, and also produced important modifications of President Madison’s policy toward Florida. In the great European conference at Vienna, the attitude and influence of Rus-
