people as "misguided, excited brethren," announced that "if they choose to form an independent nation they have a moral right to do so. "
The recoil, however, from the commercial results of sectional ascendency, and the manifestations of angry willingness in the North to have the Union relieved of the South and its institutions, were by no means universal. Exasperating expressions uttered by the rallying supporters of the new policy still more counteracted the sincere endeavors of many great leaders North and South to allay the engendered feeling. The spirit of coercion, if that should become necessary, very quickly answered the fears expressed that the valuable South might be lost. (American Conflict, 356, 397.) Politics of a party character began to work. (Blaine, 274.) The radical press ridiculed the address of Judge Shaw and his distinguished, associates, and the great war Governor of Massachusetts recommended in his message no concessions to the rebellious South, intimating that if the South seceded it would suffer the bloody fate of St. Domingo. The sentiment of nine-tenths of the Free States," said another leader, "is opposed to compromise of principle. These men want no compromise with slave labor, no unfair competition between their adventurous toil and the investments of Southern capital." Mr. Sherman, who was decidedly the most intellectual statesman of his party, and a strong partisan as he states for him self, submitted to the Philadelphia meeting his opinion that the Union of all the States must be maintained "under all circumstances against all enemies at home or abroad. Disunion is war ! God knows I do not threaten it, for I will seek to prevent it in every way possible. (Sherman s Recollections, p. 208.) A horrible suggestion was made by others in order to show how powerless the South was, that when the United States made war upon seceded States servile insurrections would secure a speedy subjugation. But this suggestion was promptly
