the spirit of secession, or by the acquiescence of the United States in an act which was deemed deplorable but nevertheless constitutional. The South rested its case on the justification of resistance and not on the form of resistance. If revolutionary resistance was justifiable, the justification of secession was proved, since in its worst aspect secession by States can only be revolution by their people.
These official declarations of the President were regarded as of somewhat doubtful interpretation and there fore did not give satisfaction. Yet the general effect of the message throughout the South was to induce further effort in the direction indicated by the Virginia speech of Mr. Toombs to secure protection against sectional aggression by the new administration before the final step of revolution or secession should be taken. It strengthened the hope of the Union men in the South, that speedy action might be taken in accordance with the plan of the President, to make such constitutional amendments and such State legislation as would secure the Southern States against external assaults upon their property, leaving them to deal with the troublesome problem in their own way.
The message was referred to the House committee of thirty-three, one from each State appointed by the speaker, but this committee was regarded by many members as being unfortunately or ominously constructed, since there were sixteen members taken from the supporters of Mr. Lincoln who represented a little more than one-third of the voters in the United States, and also because "there was not a single representative of the National Democratic party on the committee from the sixteen free States." Mr. McClernand, of Illinois, denounced the manner in which the committee had been constituted by Speaker Corwin as an offensive discrimination against the Northern Democracy. (Cong. Globe.)
When the Senate received the message, an intensely