and Clingman, whose States had hitherto refused to secede, were pleading for the withdrawal of troops from the South with a view to negotiations. The peace feeling was moving northward and invading the ranks of the party of the administration. Intelligence was also given both North and South by telegraph March i4th Fort Sumter would be evacuated. It was from about this date that a change, according to Mr. Stephens observation, began to take place in the policy of the Federal administration.
Mr. Stephens, in agreement with others, attributes this alteration in the mind of Mr. Lincoln to the pressure brought upon him by that extreme wing of his party which had been already offended by his apparent neglect of them in the formation of his cabinet. An imposing meeting of the war governors of seven States was held to organize a coercive movement by tendering to the President their military and financial support, thus inducing him to adopt a policy which would inevitably lead to war between the States North and South. Mr. Stephens expresses his belief that previous to this organized pressure Mr. Lincoln had determined on at least withdrawing Anderson from Fort Sumter as a tentative movement toward peace and reunion, that course being, according to a Cabinet member s statement, " all the administration can bear." President Lincoln was probably misinformed as to the extent to which Mr. Seward had committed himself and may have been unaware of the double dealing which was being practiced. The commissioners, however, were left without intimation until the 8th of April that their peaceful mission would be rudely thwarted. Mr. Seward stands in the history of this transaction unrelieved from the charge of duplicity. His defense may be on the doctrine that " all is fair in war" and that in diplomacy " words may be used to conceal the truth," but the evidence is ample that he dealt with Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson, and with Messrs.
