timely letter written from Washington May 1st, by Mr. Lincoln to console Captain Fox, sustains this view. In this cordial letter the sympathizing President says to Captain Fox: "I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to provision Fort Sumter should be a source of any annoyance to you. The practicability of your plan was not in fact brought to a test. By reason of a gale, well-known in advance to be possible and not improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the ground, while by an accident for which you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I to some extent was, you were deprived of a war vessel with her men which you deemed of great importance to the enterprise. I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities which you developed in the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous enterprise of a similar character you would to-day be the man of all my acquaintances whom I would select. You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result." The calculation was thus coolly made by President Lincoln and Captain Fox that the mere attempt itself to reinforce Sumter would accomplish a desired political result. If it caused the firing of a single gun by the Confederates, if the attempt caused the military reduction of the fort by the secessionists, or if the expedition composed of strong ships, manned by disciplined, well-armed troops, should succeed; in any event " the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter." The consolation of the administration came with the fulfillment of the anticipation shown in the issue of the President s proclamation, the firing of the Northern heart on account of the firing of the first gun
