eminent men of the South, constituted the committee on the part of the South, and selected Niagara Falls, on the border, as the place where they might meet such Northern statesmen as would interest themselves in the cause of peace. Horace Greeley at that time devoted his great influence to the effort to gain peace together with a restored Union. His idea was that a frank interchange of views would bring the two parties to a state of complete reconciliation in which he certainly had at first the sympathy of Mr. Lincoln. But at an interesting juncture, propitious indeed for adjustment, President Lincoln withdrew his recognition of the friendly movement, causing by this withdrawal of his favor an unfortunate and deeply regretted failure.
The conference proposed to be held at Niagara Falls was of much greater significance than any peace movement of this important date. The action of the Confederacy in stationing the three eminent statesmen in a position where they could be easily reached betrayed a desire for conference whose purpose could not be mistaken. Mr. Greeley was well advised that this overture by Mr. Davis could be turned to advantage by meeting it fully, whatever the result. With great carefulness he protected himself against all charges of disloyalty to the Union, while with enthusiasm equally great he pressed Mr. Lincoln to sanction and foster the proposed interview. If the South was for peace they must abandon secession, if for independence they must expect subjugation. On this basis Mr. Greeley could not see any reason why the administration might not develop the Southern ultimatum. But the party managers became frightened. The opposition was preparing for the Chicago convention in August. After wavering a while the President called off the interview and the budding peace withered at the touch of political necessity.
The history of this Clifton House procedure for the settlement of the war, as it was told by the testimony of the
