that the conservatives of the North still outnumbered the radicals notwithstanding the prejudices created since the war commenced, and that it was expedient to let them know the reasonable terms on" which the South was willing to stop the further shedding of fraternal blood. The only objection to these views was made that Southern overtures of any decided character would certainly be construed in the South as evidence that the Confederate government was despairing of success, which would discourage the armies, while they would also increase the growing confidence at the North that the rebellion was nearing its end. They would encourage the Northern war party. Therefore nothing was done of an official nature by the Confederate government. Perhaps nothing could have been attempted. President Davis and other Confederate leaders had already openly signified their preference for the success of McClellan on the ground that peace on proper terms could be secured if a change of administration at Washington should take place. This was as far, they thought, as prudence would permit them to go. Herschell V. Johnson, who had been the candidate for Vice-President of the United States with Stephen A. Douglas for President, entered with sympathetic earnestness into the policy of co-operation with the Chicago convention, but declared his conviction that any movement proceeding from the South would be regarded as our confession of overthrow, and the premonitory symptoms of our readiness to sue for mercy on the bended knees of unconditional surrender. We have avowed our desire for peace and our readiness for negotiations from the very beginning of the war, in every form in which organized communities can give expression to their will. We have avowed it in executive messages, in legislative resolves and congressional manifestations. What more can we do in our situation? * * * In view of the avowed object of the war on the part of the Northern Government it is very certain that there can be no peace
