double the army of Lee. This general statement that at the outset of the campaign the military strength of Grant's army doubled that of the army under Lee, has been given by many investigators who made their calculations from all authoritative sources. Taking into the computation all of the men whom Grant could readily make available for an immediate advance without endangering Washington or weakening other important positions, in comparison with the force which Lee could employ to resist his advance in May, 1864, it is ascertained that the disparity in numbers was two to one. But the difference in equipment was much greater. The army of Grant moved with resources of the ordnance, quartermaster, commissary and medical departments very greatly exceeding those of the army of Lee. It must be taken into the general consideration of General Grant's campaign that he employed the force of other columns collaterally with his own. Butler, with 30,000 men, entered the James when Grant moved across the Rapidan, and landed at Bermuda Hundred and City Point, which he fortified after one timid attempt to capture Petersburg. His operations afterward availed Grant nothing except the employment of Confederate forces under Beauregard to defeat his expeditions and finally to "bottle him up." General Sigel invaded the valley with about 10,000 men, where he was defeated by Breckinridge on May i5th at New Market. Hunter, relieving Sigel, achieved such considerable success as to require the detaching of Early, in June, to drive him from the valley. Generals Crook and Averell advanced through southwestern Virginia, but were compelled to retire before Gen. Sam Jones to the valley. Sheridan's splendid cavalry were constantly employed to the embarrassment of the Confederates from the beginning to the close of the general movement. These troops will be considered in the progress of the campaign as they increase Grant's army and consequently enlarge the disparity between his force and Lee's.
