The march of Sherman from Savannah northward bore directly upon the military situation around Richmond, and his success in placing his strong force far up into North Carolina in such dangerous proximity to Virginia brought the war to its real crisis. It is scarcely necessary to again mention the Confederate and Federal forces scattered throughout the South engaged in contests which bore slightly at this time on the impending crisis in Confederate affairs. We may, therefore, turn to Lee and Grant, so closely confronted at Petersburg that the exchange of friendly chat between the lines was often substituted for the sharp explosion of deadly arms.
Lee, having been appointed general-in-chief of all Confederate armies on the 5th of February, began to make various dispositions looking to the probability which he had contemplated before, that Richmond must be abandoned. Early in February, he placed Johnston, as already stated, in command of the army of Tennessee, or such fragments of it as remained after the campaign of 1864, and reinforced him with all troops he could send into the Carolinas from any quarter. Communications southward were kept protected, and supplies as much as possible were placed where they would be available in case Richmond was lost. It was considered that a junction of the army in Virginia with Johnston's command in Carolina, might result in the quick destruction of Sherman's force, followed by a subsequent return to recover Virginia from Grant. The great Confederate military chieftain seems to have foreseen the inevitable evacuation of Richmond, and although providing with utmost care against the calamity, made the best forecast in his power for the operations of his army after that event.
During the first months of 1865, General Grant continued to increase the efficiencies of his army for the final trial of battle with the army of Northern Virginia. Now and then he made efforts to extend to the left, bringing on several conflicts, and occasionally employed his guns
