ported, could carry victory to the heights of Gettysburg.
He selected the Federal left center as the point of attack; ordered, as on the 2d, concert of action from both wings of his army, and organized his assaulting column of 15,000 men. Stuart s cavalry had come up on his left and confronted the main body of Meade s cavalry. The situation on his extreme right was more serious than the Confederate general realized. This is evident from the reports. The Round Tops were unassailable by the force at Longstreet’s command, and a division of cavalry, Farnsworth’s and Merritt’s brigades, was in position on the right rear, confronted by a single regiment, the First South Carolina cavalry, Bachman’s South Carolina battery, and three regiments of Anderson’s Georgia brigade. Anderson s regiments were at right angles to Longstreet’s line, and Colonel Black’s cavalry was on Anderson’s right flank. Black had only about 100 men in his regiment. In Longstreet’s immediate front the situation was such that there was nothing to do but stand on the defensive. He was weaker in numbers on the 3d than he was on the morning of the 2d, and his enemy was stronger by reinforcements and the occupation of the greater of the two Round Tops. If, however, the assaulting column of 15,000 could break the center,the wings of General Meade’s army would be so shaken that both Longstreet and Ewell could attack with good hope of success, and Lee was fixed in his purpose.
The column of attack was made up of the divisions of Pickett and Pettigrew (Heth’s), to be supported by Wilcox and the brigades of Lane and Scales under Trimble.
All the available artillery of Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps was put in position by Col. E. P. Alexander, and at 1 o’clock General Longstreet ordered the batteries to open. For two hours more than 200 cannon were in action across the plain against Federal and Confederate. At 3 the assaulting column moved out from cover and down toward the Emmitsburg road, which ran between
