Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/12

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evidence was not challenged, Copeland contends the district court was required to find that "Copeland’s negligence was 100%" and thus was required to reduce SRS' subrogation right by 100%.

The reduction of SRS' recovery under § 39-719a(c) expressly occurs only "[i]n the event of a recovery pursuant to K.S.A. 60-258a." Id. § 39-719a(c). Copeland’s settlement with Toyota, however, did not constitute a recovery pursuant to § 60-258a, and thus the court was not required to reduce SRS' recovery according to Copeland’s negligence.

Section 60-258a does not address settlements, but instead contemplates a full trial on the merits in cases "[w]here the comparative negligence of the parties . . . is an issue." In such cases, § 60-258a provides that an injured party’s negligence does not bar the party from bringing an action and recovering damages, so long as the party’s negligence is less than the negligence of the alleged tortfeasor against whom recovery is sought. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(a). Section 60-258a further provides that

the jury shall return special verdicts, or in the absence of a jury, the court shall make special findings, determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the parties, and determining the total amount of damages sustained by each of the claimants, and the entry of judgment shall be made by the court. No general verdict shall be returned by the jury.

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