concluded that § 39-719a provides "a statutory right on the part of the state to full recovery of medical benefits provided to the plaintiff. . . . There is no provision for application of general common law or equitable principles, which require full recovery as a prerequisite to subrogation."
Kansas courts have not yet interpreted the language of § 39-719a to determine whether SRS' statutorily created right of subrogation is subject to traditional equitable subrogation principles. Copeland therefore relies on cases from other states in arguing that the statute incorporates unexpressed equitable principles because it creates only a subrogation right and does not provide for a lien. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 898 P.2d 353, 354, 356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding state’s statutory right to recover medical payments was not subject to equitable subrogation principles because the statute provided for a lien in addition to a subrogation right and because statute’s language emphasized full reimbursement to state). A review of the cases cited by Copeland and the specific language and structure of § 39-719a indicates that § 39719a should not be read to incorporate the equitable principles urged by Copeland.
In construing medical assistance reimbursement provisions comparable to § 39-719a, courts have generally concluded that traditional equitable principles do apply to a state’s statutory subrogation right absent some indication of legislative
-16-
