Page:Copeland By and Through Copeland v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.pdf/22

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limitation on the operation of the statute and no other exceptions will be implied").

The general language creating SRS' subrogation right further indicates that, with the exception of the limitations discussed above, SRS is entitled to full reimbursement for all medical assistance payments made to the recipient. The statute provides that when SRS has paid for medical care and when a third party has a legal obligation to pay those medical expenses, SRS "may recover the same from the recipient or from the third party and shall be in all respects subrogated to the rights of the recipient in such cases." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(a) (emphasis added). As the district court indicated, the statute thus "emphasize[s] reimbursement, which by definition denotes restoration of an amount equivalent to that expended or repayment in full.'" April 12, 1996 Memorandum & Order at 4 (quoting Paulsen, 898 P.2d at 356); cf. Dale v. Gubin, 879 S.W.2d 699, 700-701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting argument, based on equitable principles, that state’s reimbursement must be reduced by proportionate share of attorney fees because statute unambiguously provided that state agency "shall have a right to recover the full amount of payments made to a provider"). See generally Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Sloan, 871 P.2d 861, 865-66 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting, in insurance contract case, application of general equitable principles where insurance contract provisions creating subrogation right expressly provided for complete reimbursement).

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