On appeal, Copeland argues the district court erred by (1) failing to reduce SRS' recovery by the percentage of Copeland’s negligence; (2) refusing to apply equitable subrogation principles to reduce or eliminate SRS' statutory subrogation right to the settlement proceeds; and (3) ordering SRS to pay attorney fees in the amount of 33.33% of SRS’ medical assistance recovery rather than 40%. Upon de novo review of the district court’s application and interpretation of state law, we affirm. See Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 39 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1994).
I. BACKGROUND
Under the settlement agreement, Toyota agreed to pay Copeland $250,000 plus court costs of $120. The parties then applied to the district court for approval of the settlement. At a subsequent hearing, the district court stated that it would approve the settlement. The court also considered at this hearing Copeland’s Motion to Apportion Proceeds, which urged the court to order that the settlement proceeds be paid to Copeland rather than to SRS. SRS, however, asserted its statutory subrogation rights to the proceeds under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a, which provides in part that when SRS has paid medical assistance and a third party has a legal obligation to pay such expenses, SRS "may recover the same from the [medical assistance] recipient or from the third party and shall be in all respects subrogated to the rights of the recipient." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(a).
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