At a minimum, trying to determine if the negative response was to some extent context-based would be very important.
The war against Islamist insurgents will continue to be, in large part, a war against arguments, symbols, and images. That such a war is being fought in an information context unlike any other only complicates the challenges faced by the U.S. Army, and the U.S. military generally. New information and communication technologies are being used to great synergistic effect by the enemy: the military has to understand how this works and be prepared to make use of such technologies to counter enemy messaging to the extent possible, as quickly as possible. This cannot, by definition, be left to the PAO community, but must be understood by, and participated in, the entire military to have a chance at success.
ENDNOTES
1. "Hezbollah Dot Com: Hezbollah's Online Campaign,", n.p.:n.d), p. 19.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions under which particular types of attacks will attract coverage, and the amount of coverage they are likely to attract under which circumstances—in other words, using the amount of press coverage a particular attack gains as a metric for its success, see Cori E. Dauber, "The Terrorist Spectacular and the Ladder of Terrorist Success," in James Forest, ed, Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas, West Port, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009, pp. 93–122.
3. Majid Tehranian, "Review of Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, November, 1995, pp. 523–525, available from links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-7438%28199511%2927%3A4%3C523%3AS
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