'on the run' by the media …" IntelCenter, "The Evolution of Jihadi Video, EJV)," v. 1.0, May 11, 2005, p. 4, available from www.intelcenter.com/EJV-PUB-v1-0.pdf, p. 2.
13. Ibid., p. 1.
14. Ronald Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006, p. 6. Although there is no evidence it ever happened—or was even a viable idea—the fact that al-Qaeda sympathizers were discussing the possibility of strapping a cell phone camera to a missile warhead, to capture footage all the way in to the target, is evidence of the priority still placed on acquiring footage. 304th MI Bn OSINT Team, "Al Qaida Like Mobile Discussions and Potential Creative Uses," Supplemental to the 304th MI Bn Periodic Newsletter, October 16, 2008, p. 4. Although marked For Official Use Only, the document has been posted to the web by the Federation of the American Scientists, available from www.fas.org/irp/eprint/mobile.pdf.
15. Indeed, analysts have noted that as soon as the Algerian group Salafist Group for Call and Combat merged with al-Qaeda, its media efforts and production values immediately began to improve. See Stephen Black, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's Burgeoning Media Apparatus," Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, No. 14, May 15, 2007, available from www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373396. For a description of the development of al-Qaeda's media strategy, see Henry Schuster, "Al-Qaeda's Media Strategy," in Karen J. Greenberg, ed., Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 112–124.
16. Colonel Kenneth Tovo, Commander U.S. Special Forces 10th Group and Former Commander Combined Joint Special Operations Forces Task Force, Arabian Peninsula, Interview with the Author, September 21, 2006, Ft. Carson, CO.
17. Abdel bari Atwan, The Secret History of al-Qaeda, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, p. 122.
18. Personal correspondence with the Author, June 12, 2007.
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