Hezbollah, fighting to force Israel out of southern Lebanon, was in a somewhat different situation since, while their use of technology to film insurgent attacks for propaganda purposes was new and innovative, they had access to traditional broadcast venues for their footage—television networks, in other words, which were willing and eager to use their material. Thus they were able to combine the new with the old, as their use of television was anything but traditional, since their material was being shown by networks under the control of those sympathetic to the cause and looking for ways to maximize the footage's impact, not seeking to use it in the service of objective journalism.
Nonetheless, the precedent they set is still important to mention:
The visual media proved one of Hezbullah's most effective weapons. Stills, videos, and films became so central to the organization's military activities that it might reasonably be claimed that they dictated both the overall strategy and daily operations. Indeed, the organization's motto could be summed up in the words: "If you haven't captured it on film, you haven't fought." In this context, the home video camera was king. A Hezbollah guerrilla unit was accompanied by a cameraman who would videotape their operations from the front line.[1] [My emphasis]
Today even the smallest terrorist or insurgent group active in the Islamist movement, certainly those in the combat theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq, will have a specific position within the organization for the person whose responsibility is "media affairs"—in this they mirror al-Qaeda itself[2]—but this is invariably one of the highest ranking posts, obviously seen as a job of great importance and authority.[3] Indeed,
10
- ↑ Ronald Schleifer, "Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006, p. 6. Although there is no evidence it ever happened—or was even a viable idea—the fact that al-Qaeda sympathizers were discussing the possibility of strapping a cell phone camera to a missile warhead, to capture footage all the way in to the target, is evidence of the priority still placed on acquiring footage. 304th MI Bn OSINT Team, "Al Qaida Like Mobile Discussions and Potential Creative Uses," Supplemental to the 304th MI Bn Periodic Newsletter, October 16, 2008, p. 4. Although marked For Official Use Only, the document has been posted to the web by the Federation of the American Scientists, available from www.fas.org/irp/eprint/mobile.pdf.
- ↑ Indeed, analysts have noted that as soon as the Algerian group Salafist Group for Call and Combat merged with al-Qaeda, its media efforts and production values immediately began to improve. See Stephen Black, "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's Burgeoning Media Apparatus," Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, No. 14, May 15, 2007, available from www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373396. For a description of the development of al-Qaeda's media strategy, see Henry Schuster, "Al-Qaeda's Media Strategy," in Karen J. Greenberg, ed., Al-Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 112–124.
- ↑ Colonel Kenneth Tovo, Commander U.S. Special Forces 10th Group and Former Commander Combined Joint Special Operations Forces Task Force, Arabian Peninsula, Interview with the Author, September 21, 2006, Ft. Carson, CO.
