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and which is affirmed to be "unalienable," is liberty, or if you prefer it, the right to liberty. A person may have a right to lands, and yet not be in possession. The right may be worth something without the possession. As I but briefly intimated, a few passages back, that a distinction supposed, between a right to life and life itself, was only making the obscurity greater, or words to that effect: it may not occur to all my readers, that that expression was any thing more than a mere dixit of mine. To prevent such a sequence I will be more particular.
To be endowed with a right to live, and yet at the same time can not live—that is to say, a right to life, and yet not in possession—is not an endowment of any practical value. An abstract right to life, which some one has taken away from us is worth less than the carcass of a dead cut. The Creator, I apprehend, has higher occupation than making such endowments. Moreover, the right to live, would seem to conflict very much with the right to die. I doubt whether the two rights can coexist. That we have the latter, is made evident by testimony as magnificent in quantity, as it is melancholy in detail. The truth is, the right to life is in the possession. It is inseparable. If it were; if a man had a right to life after he had been dispossessed; I know of no process he could institute for its recovery. Where would he stand, while he vindicated his right? What court could he get to entertain his cause, except that of Radamanthus? Ordinary dead men, in such an emergency would want the aid of a live lawyer. Could they find one to go before the courts in the next world, to vindicate a dead man's right to life? But supposing he should recover judgment by default; what sheriff would bring him back to this world, and put him in possession of his lost property?
To be sure, man has a self-evident right to life while he lives. I do not dispute that. But it would take an immense amount of sophistry to prove his right to it after that time; or that the right was worth any thing if it could be proved. I think therefore it has been shown that the right to life and life, are one and inseparable; consequently the expression, "unalienable right to life" amounts to nothing more than "unalienable life"—the word "rights" adding no appreciable idea to the expression, or being of any practical use, except in sound—sound signifying nothing.
