unity of it also. Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold.[1] This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with the representation of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction possible. This unity, which à priori precedes all conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity (§ 6); for all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgment, and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as qualitative, §8), in that, namely, which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgments, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the understanding, even in regard to its logical use.
Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception.[2]
§ 12
The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the I think, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation, I think, is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distin-
- ↑ Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and cousequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other, is a question which we need not at present consider. Our consciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold, is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other; and it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we here treat.
- ↑ Apperception simply means consciousness. But it has been considered better to employ this term, not only because Kant saw fit to have another word besides Bewusstseyn, but because the term consciousness denotes a state, apperception an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority of the latter is apparent.—Tr.
