Opinion of the Court
gate fees awarded for representation before both the agency under §406(a) and the court under §406(b), or instead limits only the fee awarded for court representation under §406(b).
B
Petitioner Richard Culbertson represented claimant Katrina Wood in proceedings seeking Social Security disability benefits. After the agency denied Wood benefits, she brought an action in district court. For the court action, Wood signed a contingency-fee agreement “to pay a fee of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which [she] is entitled” in consideration for Culbertson’s “representation of [her] in Federal Court.” App. 8–9. The agreement excludes fees for “any representation before” the agency. Id., at 9.
The District Court reversed the agency’s denial of benefits and remanded for further proceedings. The court granted Wood attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which authorizes an award against the Government for reasonable fees in “civil action[s].” 28 U. S. C. §§2412(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A).
On remand, the agency awarded Wood past-due disability benefits and withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees that might ultimately be awarded. The agency also awarded Culbertson §406(a) fees for representing Wood before the agency.
Culbertson then moved the District Court for a separate fee award under §406(b) for representing Wood there. After accounting for the EAJA award, see Gisbrecht, supra, at 796; App. 9, this request amounted to a full 25% of past-due benefits. The court granted Culbertson’s request only in part because he did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency-level representation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on Circuit precedent to hold that “the 25% limit from §406(b)
