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many philofophers of different fe&s, both among the Chalde- ans and Greeks.— It is certain, the opinion of the Stoicks, and thofe who held an anima ?nundi, was not far from it. See Anima mundi. Lucan introduces Cato difcourfing thus: Eftne Dei fedes nifi terra, cjf pontus, & aef, Et cesium, csf virtus ? fuperos quid quarimus idtra ! Jupiter ejl quodcunq; vides, quocunq; moveris.
Luc. Pharf. 1. 9, v. 578. Strato fikewife, and others among the Peripateticks, main- tained fomething very like it; and what is more, though no ancient feet feems farther removed from Spinazifm than the Platonic, as they attributed the greateft freedom to God, and carefully diftinguifhed him from matter ; yet Gund- lingius has proved at large, that Plato gave matter much the fame origin with Spinoza. — But the fe£t that approached neareft to Spinozifm, was that which taught that all things were one, as Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides MelifTus, and efpecially Zeno Eleates, whence it obtained the name of the Eleatic fyjle?n of atbeifm. — To the fame may" alfo be reduced the opinion of thofe, who held the firft matter for God, as Almaricus and David of Dinantum. Add, that the fe£t of Foe in China and Japan, that of the Soufi in Perfia, and that of the Zindikites in Turky, are found to philofophize much after the manner of Spinoza. The chief articles in Spinoza's fyftem are reducible to thefe, — That there is but one fubftance in nature; and that this only fubftance is endued with an infinite number of attri- butes, among which are extenfion and cogitation. — That all the bodies in the univerfe are modifications of this fub- ftance confidered as it is extended ; and that all the fouls of men are modifications of the fame fubftance confidered as cogitative. — That God is a neceflary and infinitely perfect being, and is the caufe of all things that exift, but is not a different being from them. — That there is but one being and one nature; and that this nature produces within itfelf, by an immanent act, all thofe which we call creatures. — And that this being is at the fame time both agent and pa- tient, efficient caufe and fubject ; but that he produces no- thing but modifications of himfelf.
Thus is the Deity made the fole agent as well as patient in all evil, both phyiical and moral, that called malum pcena, as well as malum culpa : a doctrine fraught with more im- pieties than all the heathen poets have publifhed concerning their Jupiter, Venus, Bacchus, &c. — What feems to have led Spinoza to frame this fyftem, was the difficulty of con- ceiving, either that matter is eternal, and different from God, or that it could be produced from nothing, or that an infinite and free being could have made a world fuch as this is. — A matter that exifts neceffarily, and which never- thelefs is void of activity, and fubject to the power of a- nother principle, is an object that ftartles our underftanding ; as there feems no agreement between the three conditions. — A matter created out of nothing is no lefs inconceivable, whatever efforts we make to form an idea of an act of the will that can change what before was nothing, into real fub- ftance. Befides its being contrary to that known maxim of philofophers, ex nihilo nihil fit. — In fine, that an infinitely good, holy, free being, who could have made his creatures good, and happy, mould rather chufe to have them wicked, and eternally miferable, is no lefs incomprehenfible ; and the rather as it feems difficult to reconcile the freedom of man with the quality of a being made out of nothing. Thefe appear to have been the difficulties which led Spi- noza to fearch for a new fyftem, wherein God fhould not be diftinct from matter, and wherein he fhould act necef- farily, and to the extent of all his power, not out of himfelf [ad extra] but within himfelf.— But it is certain, if the new fyftem refcue us from fome difficulties, it involves us in others much greater. — For,
i a . It is impoffible the univerfe fhould be but one fub- ftance ; fince every thing that is extended muff, neceffarily have parts j and what has parts muft be compounded. And as the parts of extenfion do not fubfift in each other, it follows, either that extenfion in. the general is not fubftance, or that every part of extenfion is a different fubftance. Now, according to Spinoza^ extenfion in general is an attribute of fubftance. And he allows, with other philofophers, that the attributes of fubftance do not differ really from the fubftance itfelf. He muft therefore allow, that extenfion in general is fubftance : whence it will follow, that every part of extenfi- on is a particular fubftance: which overturns the whole fyftem. If it be objected, that Spinoza does not confider different bodies, as different parts of extenfion, but as different modifications of it} the diftindtion between part and modification, we doubt will hardly fave him. For let him avoid the word part as much as he pleafe, and fubftitnte that of modality or modification for it, the doctrine will amount to much the fame : the ch.aracf.ers of diverfity are not lefs real and evident, when matter is divided into modifications, than when it is divided into parts. The idea of the univerfe will itill be that of a compound being, or an aggregate of feveral fubftances. For proof of this, it may be obferved, that modalities are be- ings which cannot exift without the fubftance which modifies them; whence it follows, that the fubftance muft be found when- ever iw modalities are found ; and even that the fubftance mult be multiplied in proportion as the number of incompatible modifica- tions is multiplied ; fo that wherever there are five or fix of thefe modifications, there mult be five or fix fubftances. Ic is evident,
that a fquare figure, and a circular figure are incompatible in the fame piece of wax. Whence it follows, that the fubftance mo- . dified by the fquare figure cannot be the fame fubftance with that modified by the round figure. So when I fee a round and a fquare table in a room, I may fafely affert, that the extenfion which makes the fubjecf of the round table is a diitincr. fubftance from the extenfion which is the fubjeft of the fquare table : fince otherwife it would follow, that the fquare and round figures might be found. in the . fame fubject. at the fame time. — The fubject., therefore, that is modified by two figures, muft be two fubftances. 2°. If it be abfurd to make God extended, as this robs him of his fimplicity, and makes him be compofed of parts ; it is Hill worfe to reduce him to the condition of matter, the Joweft of all beings, and that which mofl of the ancient philofophers ranked immediately above nothing ; matter ! the theatre of all forts of changes, the field of battle of contrary caufes, the fubjea of all corruptions and generations; in'a word, the being molr incompa- tible with the immutability of the' Deity !
Thefpinozifis, indeed, maintain, fha* it is not fufceptible of any divifion; but the argument theyalledge in proof of it, we have elfewhere lhcwn to be falfe: it is, that,fpr. matter to be divided, it is necefiary that one of the parts be 'feperafsd 'from the other by a void fp.ee, which is impoffible : fince there is no Vacuum in nature. See Vacuum.
3 .If Sfmozifm appear extravagant when we confider God as the fiibjecl: of all the mutations, corruptions and generations in bo- dies; it will be found ftill worfe, "when we confider him as the ' fubjecl: of all the modifications of thinking, It is no fmall diffi- culty, _ to unite extenfion and thinking in the fame fubftance ; fince it is not an union like that of two metals, or of water and wine, that will ferve the purpofe : thefe lart require only juxta- pofirion;_ whereas to combine thinking and extenfion requires an identity : thinking and extended are two attributes identified with the fubftance ; and confequently are identified with each other, by the fundamental rule of all logic.
Again, when we fay, that a man denies this, affirms that, likes that, &c. we make all thofe attributes fall on the fubftance of his mind, not on his thoughts, which are only accidents or modifications of it. If therefore what Spinoza advances be true, that men are modalities of God; it would be falfe to fay, Pete? denies, likes, 'wills, Sec. ftnee in reality, on this fyftem, it is God that denies, wills, C5V. and confequently all the denominations which arife from the thoughts, defires, CSV. of men, fall properly and phyn- cally on the fubftance of God. From whence it alfo follows, that God affirms and denies, loves and hates, wills and nills the fame thing, at the fame time, and under the fame conditions: contrary to the great principle of reafoning : oppofita funt qua cjf neq; deft innjicem, ?ieq; de eodem tertio fecundum idem, ad idem, codem modo atq} tempore njere affirmari pofunt ; which mull be falfe, if Spinozifm be true : fince it cannot be denied but fome men love and affirni what others hate and deny, under all the conditions exprefled in the rule. 4 . Eut if it be phyfically abfurd, to fay che fame fubject is mo- d lfied at the fame time with all the different thoughts of all men ; it is horrible when we confider it in a moral light. Since itwiU follow, that the infinite, the all-perfect Being is not confhnt, is not the fame one moment, but is eternally poffefled even with contrary paffions ; all the uniformity in him in this refpeft, will be, that for one good and wife thought. he will have twenty foolifh and wicked ones. He will not only be the efficient caufe of all the errors, iniquities and impurities of men, but alfo the paflive fub- jeft of them, the fubjeftum inhafionis. He muft be united with them in the clofefl manner that can be conceived, even by a pe- netrative union, or rather an identity, fince the mode is not really diftinft from the fubftance modified. T.
TRAVERSE, in law, denotes the denial of fome matter of fiifl, alledged to be done in a declaration, or pleadings; upon which the other fide coming and maintaining that it was done, iffue is joined for the caufe to proceed to trial. See Issue, and Trial. The formal words of a tranjerfe are in the law French, fans ceo, in Latin, abfque hoc, and in Englifh, without that, k$c. An anfwer, fays Weft {fpeaking of bills in chancery) is that which .the defendant pleadeth or faitfi in bar to avoid the plain- tiff's bill or action, either by confeffion and avoiding, or by deny- ing and tramerfing the material parts thereof. A replication is the plaintiffs reply to the defendant's anfwer, which muft affirm and purfue his bill, and confefs and avoid, deny or tranjerfe the defendant's anfwer.
A plea is naught which neither tranjerfes nor confefleth the plain- tiffs title, cifV. Every matter in faft alledged by the plaintiff, may be tranjerfed by the defendant, but not matter of law, or what is part matter of law, and part matter of facf ; nor may a record be tranjerfed, as this is not to be tried by a jury. If a matter be exprefly pleaded in the affirmative, which is ex- prefly anfwered in the negative, no tranjerfe is neceflary, there being a fufficient iffue joined : alfo where the defendant hath given a particular anfwer in his plea, to all the material points contain- ed in the declaration, he need not take a tranjerfe ; for that when the thing is anfwered, there needs no further denial.
Traverse of an indiftment or preferment, is the contradicting or de- nying fome chief point of it," and taking ifTue thereon. See In- dictment, and Presentment. — Thus, in a prefentment againit a perfon for a highway overflowed with water, for default of lcour- ing a ditch, &c. he may either tranjerfe the ?natter, by alledging that there is no highway, or that the ditch is fufficiently fcoured; or he may tranjerfe the caufe, viz. by alledging that he hath not the land, or that he and they whofe eftate t?<\ have not ufed cleanfe the ditch.
Traverse of an office, is the proving that an inquifition made of lands or goods is defective, and untruly made. See Office, and Inquisition.
No perfon fhall tranjerfe an office, unlefs he can make to himfelf a good right and title: and if one be admitted to tranjerfe an of- fice, this admiffion of the party to the iraverfe, fuppofes the title to be in him, or elfe he bad no caufe of tranjerfe.
FINIS.
