is bounded by no measurable limits. Such an attempt at measurement is post-mortem. The resultants of a previous period are neatly added up; and if they do not correspond to a very incomplete formula for value it is suggested that we “adjust” our unit. It is a proposal calculated to make a scientist turn in his grave.
The phrase “relative value” as used in juxtaposition to “exchange value” and “use value” furnishes another example of the political-economist’s craving “to make three bites of a cherry”—and at that he is often one bite short. The orthodox teachers employ these three terms, and fail to emphasize the fact that “use value” is conductivity, while “exchange value” is inducement.
“Relative value,” as they employ the term, means nothing whatever. The value of X in terms of Y (both X and Y being unknown) is obviously XY ; and the value of Y in terms of X is just as obviously YX . Perfectly true—and perfectly useless!
If, however, the economists would take the fourth and final bite at their cherry and look at the matter as a whole they would then be justified in talking about “relative value.”
The phrase “use value,” as employed by the economists, most closely approximates “total value,” since it also includes much that has “exchange value”; but, from Adam Smith on, a distinction has been drawn between “value in use” and “value in exchange.”
It is difficult to avoid the customary review of the many qualities put forward by the economists:—natural value, intrinsic value, subjective value, normal value, social value, site value, cost value, scarcity value, teleologic value, final utility, marginal utility, subjective utility, ophelimity, utility, importance, desirability, desiredness, appetibility, etc., etc.
“Use value” is selected here (a little arbitrarily) to represent every contributing quality of value which cannot be classified properly as “exchange value.” This may be regarded as an irreverent avoidance of detail; but if economic value is ef-