danger threatening the doer of an action which the adherents of authoritative morals live in view, but their own danger, the loss of power and authority which might cause if the right of arbitrary and foolish action in conformity with their own lesser or greater rationality were granted to all: they themselves unhesitatingly make use of the right of arbitrariness and folly—they even command where an answer to the question, "How amI to act? Why am I to act ?" is barely possible, or, at least, sufficiently difficult. And if the reason of mankind grows with such extraordinary slackness tlat this growth as regards the whole cause of human history, has often been denied: what is more blameworthy than this solemn presence, this ubiquity of moral commands, which does not even allow the mere utterance of the individual question about the Why? and the How?Have we not been educated in such wise as to feel pathetically and flee into darkness at the very time when our reason ought to judge as clearly and coolly as possible, that is, in all higher and more important affairs?
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‘’A for theses.’’—We ought not to give to the individual, in as far as he wishes for his own happiness, any precepts for the road to happiness; for individual happiness springs from particular laws unknown to everybody, outside precepts could only prevent or check
