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In how far we hare to beware of pity.—Pity, in so far as it really eases suffering—and this shall here be our only point of view—is a weakness like every other indulgence in an injurious passion. It increases the world’s suffering: though now and then some suffering may be indirectly diminished or relieved in consequence of pity, we must not adduce these occasional and on the whole unimportant consequences to justify its nature, which, us already stated, is injurious, Suppose that it prevailed for only one day, would not humanity be brought to ruin by it? In itself it has no better character than any other craving; only where it is required and praised, and this happens when we do not understand its injurious side, but discover in it a source of delight, good conscience attaches itself to it; only then we gladly yield to it and are not afraid of its manifestation. Under other circumstances, where it is known to be hurtful, it is considered a weakness, or, as among the Greeks, a morbid, periodical impulse which we may deprive of its jeopardising nature by temporary and arbitrary discharges. Should a person just for once experimentally and intentionally make the occasions for pity in practical life for a while the object of his attention, and again and again picture to his mind all the misery he may meet with in his surroundings, he will assuredly grow ill and despondent. But should he wish to serve mankind in any sense of the word as a
