philosophical architects in Europe have built in vain? That everything which they themselves honestly and seriously looked upon as aere perennius threatens to collapse or has already fallen to ruins? Oh, how per-verse is the answer which, even in our days, is in readliness for this question, "Because they all have neglected the supposition, the test of the fundament, a criticism of pure reason,"—that fatal answer of Kant which snrely has not led as modern philosopliers on to a firmer and less fallacious ground (was it not strange to expect that a tool should criticise its own excellence and fitness? That the intellect itself should know its own worth, power, limits?" Was it not even absurd?). The right answer would surely have been, that all philo-sophers—even Kant—were building mder the misleading influence of morals; that they apparently aimed at cer-tainty, "trutlı," but, in reality, at "majestic moral structures: to avail ourselves once more of Kant's in-offensive Ianguage, who denotes it as his special "not very brilliant, yet well-deserving" task and work to "level" and solidate the ground for these majestic moral (Criticism of Pure Reason, ii. p. 257). Alas! he utterly failed in this task !—as we have to admit. With such an enthusiastic purpose Kant was the true son of his century, which, if ever any, may be called the century of enthusiasm : and its true son he fortunately continued to be also with regard to its more valuable manifestations with that sound sensuality, for
