ment great and undefined powers as to its legislative and executive; well knowing that, by departing from a federal system, they paved the way for their favorite object—the destruction of the state governments, and the introduction of monarchy. And hence, Mr. Speaker, I apprehend, in a great measure, arose the objections of those honorable members, Mr. Mason and Mr. Gerry. In every thing that tended to give the large states power over the smaller, the first of those gentlemen could not forget he belonged to the Ancient Dominion; nor could the latter forget that he represented Old Massachusetts; that part of the system which tended to give those states power over the others met with their perfect approbation. But when they viewed it charged with such powers as would destroy all state governments, their own as well as the rest,—when they saw a President so constituted as to differ from a monarch scarcely but in name, and having it in his power to become such in reality when he pleased,—they, being republicans and federalists, as far as an attachment to their own states would permit them, warmly and zealously opposed those parts of the system. From these different sentiments, and from this combination of interest, I apprehend, sir, proceeded the fate of what was called the Jersey resolutions, and the report made by the committee of the whole house.
The Jersey propositions being thus rejected, the Convention took up those reported by the committee, and proceeded to debate them by paragraphs. It was now that they who disapproved the report found it necessary to make a warm and decided opposition, which took place upon the discussion of the seventh resolution, which related to the inequality of representation in the first branch. Those who advocated this inequality, urged, that, when the Articles of Confederation were formed, it was only from necessity and expediency that the states were admitted each to have an equal vote; but that our situation was now altered, and therefore those states who considered it contrary to their interest would no longer abide by it. They said no state ought to wish to have influence in government, except in proportion to what it contributes to it; that if it contributes but little, it ought to have but a small vote; that taxation and representation ought always to go together; that, if one state had sixteen times as many inhabitants as another, or was sixteen times as wealthy, it ought to have sixteen times as many votes; that an inhabitant of Pennsylvania ought to have as much weight and consequence as an inhabitant of Jersey or Delaware; that it was contrary to the feelings of the human mind—what the large states would never submit to; that the large states would have great objects in view, in which they would never permit the smaller states to thwart them; that equality of suffrage was the rotten part of the Constitution, and that this was a happy time to get clear of it. In fine, it was the poison which contaminated our whole system, and the source of all the evils we experienced.
This, sir, is the substance of the arguments,—if arguments they may be called,—which were used in favor of inequality of suffrage. Those who advocated the equality of suffrage took the matter up on the original principles of government. They urged that all men, considered in a state of nature, before any government is formed, are equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority to exercise power over another, and this without any regard to difference in personal strength, understanding, or wealth—that, when such individuals enter into government, they have each a right to an equal voice in its first formation, and afterwards have each a right to an equal vote in every matter which relates
