ernments, and for regulating all their concerns: and a strong, energetic federal government over those states, for the protection and preservation, and for regulating the common concerns of the states.
It was further insisted that, even if it was possible to effect a total abolition of the state governments at this time, and to establish one general government over the people of America, it could not long subsist, but in a little time would again be broken into a variety of governments of a smaller extent, similar, in some manner, to the present situation of this continent. The principal difference, in all probability, would be, that the governments so established, being effected by some violent convulsion, might not be formed on principles so favorable to liberty as those of our present state governments—that this ought to be an important consideration to such of the states who had excellent governments, which was the case with Maryland, and most others, whatever it might be to persons who, disapproving of their particular state government, would be willing to hazard every thing to overturn and destroy it. These reasons, sir, influenced me to vote against two branches in the legislature, and against every part of the system which was repugnant to the principles of a federal government. Nor was there a single argument urged, or reason assigned, which, to my mind, was satisfactory to prove that a good government, on federal principles, was unattainable; the whole of their arguments only proving, what none of us controverted—that our federal government, as originally formed, was defective, and wanted amendment.
However, a majority of the Convention, hastily and inconsiderately, without condescending to make a fair trial, in their great wisdom decided that a kind of government which a Montesquieu and a Price have declared the best calculated of any to preserve internal liberty, and to enjoy external strength and security, and the only one by which a large continent can be connected and united, consistently with the principles of liberty, was totally impracticable; and they acted accordingly.
With respect to that part of the second section of the first article which relates to the apportionment of representation and direct taxation, there were considerable objections made to it, besides the great objection of inequality. It was urged, that no principle could justify taking slaves into computation in apportioning the number of representatives a state should have in the government—that it involved the absurdity of increasing the power of a state in making laws for free men in proportion as that state violated the rights of freedom—that it might be proper to take slaves into consideration, when taxes were to be apportioned, because it had a tendency to discourage slavery; but to take them into account in giving representation tended to encourage the slave trade, and to make it the interest of the states to continue that infamous traffic—that slaves could not be taken into account as men, or citizens, because they were not admitted to the rights of citizens, in the states which adopted or continued slavery. If they were to be taken into account as property, it was asked what peculiar circumstance should render this property (of all others the most odious in its nature) entitled to the high privilege of conferring; consequence and power in the government to its possessors, rather than any other property; and why slaves should, as property, be taken into account rather than horses, cattle, mules, or any other species; and it was observed, by an honorable member from Massachusetts, that he considered it as dishonorable and humiliating to enter into compact with the slaves of the Southern States, as it would with the horses and mules of
