shown that the idea was totally fallacious, which was attempted to be maintained, that, if a state had one thirteenth part of the numbers composing the delegation in this system, such state would have as much influence as under the Articles of Confederation. To prove the fallacy of this idea, it was shown that, under the Articles of Confederation, the state of Maryland had but one vote in thirteen; yet no measure could be carried against her interests without seven states, a majority of the whole, concurring in it; whereas, in this system, though Maryland has six votes—which is more than the proportion of one in thirteen,—yet five states may, in a variety of combinations, carry a question against her interest, though seven other states concur with her, and six states, by a much greater number of combinations, may carry a measure against Maryland, united with six other states. I shall here, sir, just observe, that, as the committee of detail reported the system, the delegates from the different states were to be one for every forty thousand inhabitants: it was afterwards altered to one for every thirty thousand. This alteration was made after I left the Convention, at the instance of whom I know not; but it is evident that the alteration is in favor of the states which have large and extensive territory, to increase their power and influence in the government, and to the injury of the smaller states; since it is the states of extensive territory who will most speedily increase the number of their inhabitants, as before has been observed, and will, therefore, most speedily procure an increase to the number of their delegates. By this alteration, Virginia, North Carolina, or Georgia, by obtaining one hundred and twenty thousand additional inhabitants, will be entitled to four additional delegates; whereas such state would only have been entitled to three, if forty thousand had remained the number by which to apportion the delegation.
As to that part of this section that relates to direct taxation, there was also an objection for the following reasons: It was said that a large sum of money was to be brought into the national treasury by the duties on commerce, which would be almost wholly paid by the commercial states; it would be unequal and unjust that the sum which was necessary to be raised by direct taxation should be apportioned equally upon all the states, obliging the commercial states to pay as large a share of the revenue arising therefrom as the states from whom no revenue had been drawn by imposts; since the wealth and industry of the inhabitants of the commercial states will, in the first place, be severely taxed through their commerce, and afterwards be equally taxed with the industry and wealth of the inhabitants of the other states, who have paid no part of that revenue, so that, by this provision, the inhabitants of the commercial states are, in this system, obliged to bear an unreasonable and disproportionate share in the expenses of the Union, and the payment of that foreign and domestic debt which was incurred not more for the benefit of the commercial thin of the other states.
In the sixth section of the first article, it is provided, that senators and representatives may be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, except such as shall have been created, or the emoluments of which have been increased, during the time for which they were elected. Upon this subject, sir, there was a great diversity of sentiment among the members of the Convention. As the propositions were reported by the committee of the whole house, a senator or representative could not be appointed to any office under a particular state, or under the United States, during the time for which they were chosen, nor to any
