or violating the constitution of our government; and that, considering the administration of the government would be principally in the hands of the wealthy, there could be little reason to fear an abuse of the power by an unnecessary or injurious exercise of it. But, sir, a majority of the Convention, being wise beyond every event, and being willing to risk any political evil rather than admit the idea of a paper emission in any possible case, refused to trust this authority to a government to which they were lavishing the most unlimited powers of taxation, and to the mercy of which they were willing blindly to trust the liberty and property of the citizens of every state in the Union; and they erased that clause from the system. Among other powers given to this government in the eighth section, it has that of appointing tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. To this power there was an opposition. It was urged that there was no occasion for inferior courts of the general government to be appointed in the different states, and that such ought not to be admitted—that the different state judiciaries in the respective states would be competent to, and sufficient for, the cognizance in the first instance of all cases that should arise under the laws of the general government, which, being by this system made the supreme law of the states, would be binding on the different state judiciaries—that, by giving an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the general government would have a sufficient check over their decisions, and security for the enforcing of their laws—that to have inferior courts appointed under the authority of Congress, in the different states, would eventually absorb and swallow up the state judiciaries, by drawing all business from them to the courts of the general government, which the extensive and undefined powers, legislative and judicial, of which it is possessed, would easily enable it to do—that it would unduly and dangerously increase the weight and influence of Congress in the several states; be productive of a prodigious number of officers; and be attended with an enormous additional and unnecessary expense—that, the judiciaries of the respective states not having power to decide upon the laws of the general government, but the determination of those laws being confined to the judiciaries appointed under the authority of Congress in the first instance, as well as on appeal, there would be a necessity for judges or magistrates of the general government, and those to a considerable number, in each county of every state—that there would be a necessity for courts to be holden by them in each county, and that these courts would stand in need of all proper officers, such as sheriffs, clerks, and others, commissioned under the authority of the general government—in fine, that the administration of justice, as it will relate to the laws of the general government, would require in each state all the magistrates, courts, officers, and expense, which are now found necessary, in the respective states, for the administration of justice as it relates to the laws of the state governments. But here, again, we were overruled by a majority, who, assuming it as a principle that the general government and the state governments (as long as they should exist) would be at perpetual variance and enmity, and that their interests would constantly be opposed to each other, insisted, for that reason, that the state judges, being citizens of their respective states, and holding their commissions under them, ought not, though acting on oath, to be intrusted with the administration of the laws of the general government.
By the eighth section of the first article, the Congress have also a power (riven them to raise and support armies, without any limitation as
