Constitution, and establish himself in regal authority; in which attempt a provision is made for him to secure from punishment the creatures of his ambition, the associates and abettors of his treasonable practices, by granting them pardons, should they be defeated in their attempts to subvert the Constitution.
To that part of this article, also, which gives the President a right to nominate, and with the consent of the Senate to appoint, all the officers, civil and military, of the United States, there was considerable opposition. It was said that the person who nominates will always in reality appoint, and that this was giving the President a power and influence which, together with the other powers bestowed upon him, would place him above all restraint or control. In fine, it was urged that the President, as here constituted, was a king in every thing but the name; that though he was to be chosen for a limited time, yet, at the expiration of that time, if he is not reëlected, it will depend entirely upon his own moderation whether he will resign that authority with which he has once been invested—that, from his having the appointment of all the variety of officers in every part of the civil department for the Union, who will be very numerous in themselves and their connections, relations, friends, and dependants, he will have a formidable host devoted to his interest, and ready to support his ambitious views—that the army and navy, which may be increased without restraint as to numbers; the officers of which, from the highest to the lowest, are all to be appointed by him, and dependent on his will and pleasure, and commanded by him in person, will, of course, be subservient to his wishes, and ready to execute his commands; in addition to which, the militia are also entirely subjected to his orders—that these circumstances, combined together, will enable him, when he pleases, to become a king in name, as well as in substance, and establish himself in office not only for his own life, but even, if he chooses, to have that authority perpetuated to his family.
It was further observed, that the only appearance of responsibility in the President, which the system holds up to our view, is the provision for impeachment; but that, when we reflect that he cannot be impeached but by the House of Delegates, and that the members of this house are rendered dependent upon, and unduly under the influence of, the President, by being appointable to offices of which he has the sole nomination, so that, without his favor and approbation, they cannot obtain them, there is little reason to believe that a majority will ever concur in impeaching the President, let his conduct be ever so reprehensible; especially, too, as the final event of that impeachment will depend upon a different body, and the members of the House of Delegates will be certain, should the decision be ultimately in favor of the President, to become thereby the objects of his displeasure, and to bar to themselves every avenue to the emoluments of government.
Should he, contrary to probability, be impeached, he is afterwards to be tried and adjudged by the Senate, and without the concurrence of two thirds of the members who shall be present, he cannot be convicted. This Senate being constituted a privy council to the President, it is probable many of its leading and influential members may have advised or concurred in the very measures for which he may be impeached. The members of the Senate also are. by the system, placed as unduly under the influence of, and dependent upon, the President, as the members of the other branch, since they also are appointable to offices, and cannot obtain them but through the favor of the President.
