Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v1.djvu/483

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
YATES'S MINUTES.
463

any of the state governments. The Senate of New York are chosen by persons of certain qualifications, to the exclusion of others. The question, after all, is, Is it our interest, in modifying this general government, to sacrifice individual rights to the preservation of the rights of an artificial being, called states? There can be no truer principle than this—that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of government. If, therefore, three states contain a majority of the inhabitants of America, ought they to be governed by a minority? Would the inhabitants of the great states ever submit to this? If the smaller states maintain this principle, through a love of power, will not the larger, from the same motive, be equally tenacious to preserve their power? They are to surrender their rights: for what?—for the preservation of an artificial being. We propose a free government. Can it be so if partial distinctions are maintained? I agree with the gentleman from Delaware that, if the state governments are to act in the general government, it affords the strongest reason for exclusion. In the state of New York, five counties form a majority of representatives, and yet the government is in no danger, because the laws have a general operation. The small states exaggerate their danger, and on this ground contend for an unproportion of power. But their danger is increased if the larger states will not submit to it. Where will they form new alliances for their support? Will they do this with foreign powers? Foreigners are jealous of our increasing greatness, and would rejoice in our distractions. Those who have had opportunities of conversing with foreigners respecting sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in them an anxiety for the preservation of our democratic governments, probably for no other reason but to keep us weak. Unless your government is respectable, foreigners will invade your rights; and to maintain tranquillity you must be respectable; even to observe neutrality you must have a strong government. I confess our present situation is critical. We have just finished a war which has established our independency, and loaded us with a heavy debt. We have still every motive to unite for our common defence. Our people are disposed to have a good government; but this disposition may not always prevail. It is difficult to amend confederations. It has been attempted in vain, and it is perhaps