third must control two thirds—24 overrule 66. For whom do we form a Constitution? For men, or for imaginary beings, called states—a mere metaphysical distinction? Will a regard to state rights justify the sacrifice of the rights of men? If we proceed on any other foundation than the last our building will neither be solid nor lasting. Weight and numbers is the only true principle: every other is local, confined, or imaginary. Much has been said of the danger of the three larger states combining together to give rise to monarchy or an aristocracy. Let the probability of this combination be explained, and it will be found that a rivalship, rather than a confederacy, will exist among them. Is there a single point in which this interest coincides? Supposing that the executive should be selected from one of the larger states; can the other two be gratified? Will not this be a source of jealousy amongst them; and will they not separately court the interest of the smaller states, to counteract the views of a favorite rival? How can aristocracy arise from this combination, more than amongst the smaller states? On the contrary, the present claims of the smaller states lead directly to the establishment of an aristocracy, which is the government of the few over the many; and the Connecticut proposal removes only a small part of the objection. There are only two kinds of bad government—the one, which does too much, and therefore oppressive, and the other, which does too little, and therefore weak. Congress partakes of the latter, and the motion will leave us in the same situation, and as much fettered as ever we were. The people see its weakness, and would be mortified in seeing our inability to correct it.
The gentleman from Georgia has his doubts how to vote on this question, and wishes some qualification of it to be made. I admit there ought to be some difference as to the numbers in the second branch; and perhaps there are other distinctions which could, with propriety, be introduced; such, for example, as the qualifications of the elected, &c. However, if there are leading principles in the system which we adopt, much may be done in the detail. We all aim at giving the general government more energy. The state governments are necessary and valuable. No liberty can be obtained without them. On this question depend the essential rights of the general government and of the people.
