ject of government. He observed that, in the then state of things, it was problematical, at least, whether we would recur to the old Confederation; but, as many gentlemen thought it possible, he would proceed to investigate it. He then went through the Confederation, and showed that the powers intended to be vested in Congress were very similar to those given by the new government, to wit: to raise troops, possess a common treasure, borrow money, make treaties, appoint civil officers, &c. He observed that as, on the one hand, the want of these powers would not be objected to in the Confederation, so, on the other, the possession of them could not be urged as a fault in the new plan.
He asked whether, with these powers, it had been able to effect the purposes designed by the Union; whether it had repelled invaders, maintained domestic peace, supported our credit, or extended our commerce. He proved that not one of these objects had been effected by it. He pointed to the British possessions in the limits of this state, held in defiance of the most solemn treaties, and contempt of our government, as proof of its incompetency to defend our rights against foreign powers. How has it happened, said he, that Vermont is, at this moment, an independent state? How has it happened that new states have been rent from those on the west, that were entitled to protection? He asked if any gentlemen would assert that our national credit was fixed upon a proper basis; that our commerce enjoyed the advantages we had a right to expect. If, then, said he, experience has shown that the existing Confederation (if I may use the term) has not answered the great ends of the Union, it must either have arisen from an insufficiency in its powers, or from some defect in the execution of them: if insufficient, more should be added; if not executed, the cause should be inquired into. He showed that, with the addition of a few powers, those it possessed were competent to the purposes of the Union; but that the defect of the system rested in the impossibility of carrying into effect the rights invested in them by the states. He then ran through every power intended to be vested in Congress, and showed that the exercise of them, by the intervention of the state governments, and subject to their pleasure or their different views of the matters recommended to them, would be attended with insuperable difficulties, inconveniences, and
