Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v2.djvu/73

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Dawes.]
MASSACHUSETTS.
57

the power is too great, and by this Constitution is to be sacred. But if the want of power is the defect in the old Confederation, there is a fitness and propriety in adopting what is here proposed, which gives the necessary power wanted. Congress now have power to call for what moneys, and in what proportion, they please; but they have no authority to compel a compliance therewith. It is an objection in some gentlemen's minds, that Congress should possess the power of the purse and the sword. But, sir, I would ask, whether any government can exist, or give security to the people, which is not possessed of this power. The first revenue will be raised from the impost, to which there is no objection, the next from the excise; and if these are not sufficient, direct taxes must be laid. To conclude, sir, if we mean to support an efficient federal government, which, under the old Confederation, can never be the case, the proposed Constitution is, in my opinion, the only one that can be substituted.

Hon. Mr. WHITE said, in giving this power, we give up every thing; and Congress, with the purse-strings in their hands, will use the sword with a witness.

Mr. DAWES said, he thought the powers in the paragraph under debate should be fully vested in Congress. We have suffered, said he, for want of such authority in the federal head. This will be evident if we take a short view of our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Our agriculture has not been encouraged by the imposition of national duties on rival produce; nor can it be, so long as the several states may make contradictory laws. This has induced our farmers to raise only what they wanted to consume in their own families; I mean, however, after raising enough to pay their own taxes; for I insist that, upon the old plan, the land has borne the burden; for, as Congress could not make laws, whereby they could obtain a revenue, in their own way, from impost or excise, they multiplied their requisition on the several states. When a state was thus called on, it would perhaps impose new duties on its own trade, to procure money for paying its quota of federal demands. This would drive the trade to such neighboring states as made no such new impositions; thus the revenue would be lost with the trade, and the only resort would be a direct tax.

As to commerce, it is well known that the different states
vol. ii.8