Virginia herself! Money is the nerve—the life and soul of a government. It is the utmost folly to say that a government could be carried on without this great agent of human affairs. Wars cannot be carried on without a full and uncontrolled discretionary power to raise money in an eligible manner. Nay, sir, government cannot be administered in time of peace without this power. For how is it to be done? It is needless to impress any further on the minds of the gentlemen who hear me the necessity of this power in governments. If so, ought the general government to be more circumscribed in the power of providing for its own safety and existence than any other government? Ought it to depend for the means of its preservation on other bodies? This is actually the case with the Confederation. The power of raising money was nominally vested in that system. In March, 1781, even Maryland, the most backward state then, conceded that Congress should have the power of receiving and demanding their proportionate quotas of the states. This was an acknowledgment of the necessity of vesting a power in Congress to raise such sums as emergencies might require; but the means which were proposed have been found inadequate to compass the end: the propriety of the means is alone disputed. No doubt it is the universal opinion of the people of this commonwealth, that its legislature should have the power of raising money at its own will and pleasure. There are two ways whereby this may be effected—by requisitions, or taxation: there is no other manner; for it surpasses the ingenuity of man to devise any other mode of raising money than by one of these two methods. If the alternative of requisitions be determined upon, as more eligible, it will not avail without coercion. If that of taxation be preferred, it will be sufficient without any coercion. If our legislature were to depend on requisitions for money to answer the ends of government, then, sir, the absurdity and sophistry of the arguments urged in defence of such a mode of procuring money would strike the weakest intellect. If the mere pleasure of individuals were alone to be consulted, if it were left to the choice of your people to pay or not, your treasury would be much poorer than it is; and the advocates of this pernicious policy would perhaps be ashamed of their pertinacity. Suppose, for a moment, the only ex-
