Page:Debates in the Several State Conventions, v3.djvu/229

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Monroe.]
VIRGINIA.
213

actions are well known in every state, and need hardly be mentioned. Certain it is that Great Britain is desirous of peace, and that it is her true interest to be in friendship with us: it is also so with Spain. Another circumstance which has been dwelt upon is, the necessity of the protection of commerce. What does our commerce require? Does it want extension and protection? Will treaties answer these ends? Treaties, sir, will not extend your commerce. Our object is the regulation of commerce, and not treaties. Our treaties with Holland, Prussia, and other powers, are of no consequence. It is not to the advantage of the United States to make any compact with any nation with respect to trade. Our trade is engrossed by a country with which we have no commercial treaty. That country is Great Britain. That monopoly is the result of the want of a judicious regulation on our part. It is as valuable and advantageous to them, on its present footing, nay, more so, than it could be by any treaty. It is the interest of the United States to invite all nations to trade with them; to open their ports to all, and grant no exclusive privilege to any, in preference to others. I apprehend no treaty that could be made can be of any advantage to us. If those nations opened any of their ports to us in the East or West Indies, it would be of advantage to us; but there is no probability of this. France and Holland have been said to be threatening for the payment of the debts due to them. I understand that Holland has added to her favors to us by lending us other sums lately. This is a proof that she has no hostile intent against us, and that she is willing to indulge us. France has made no pressing demand. Our country has received from that kingdom the highest proof of favors which a magnanimous power can show: nor are there any grounds to suspect a diminution of its friendship. Having examined the analogy between the ancient leagues and our confederacy, and shown that we have no danger to apprehend from Europe, I conclude that we are in no danger of immediate disunion, but that we may calmly and dispassionately examine the defects of our government, and apply such remedies as we shall find necessary.

I proceed now to the examination of the Confederation, and to take a comparative view of this Constitution. In examining either, a division into two heads is proper, viz.