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Madison.]
VIRGINIA.
305

whatever. I therefore think that we ought to ratify it, in order to secure the Union, and trust to this method for removing those inconveniences which experience shall point out.

[Mr. Pendleton added several other observations, but spoke too low to be heard.]

Mr. MADISON. Mr. Chairman: finding, sir, that the clause more immediately under consideration still meets with the disapprobation of the honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr. Grayson,) and finding that the reasons of the opposition, as further developed, are not satisfactory to myself and others who are in favor of the clause, I wish that it may meet with the most thorough and complete investigation. I beg the attention of the committee, in order to obviate what fell from the honorable gentleman. He set forth that, by giving up the power of taxation, we should give up every thing, and still insists on requisitions being made on the states, and then, if they be not complied with, Congress shall lay direct taxes, by way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma which arises from this doctrine. Either requisitions will be efficacious, or they will not. If they will be efficacious, then I say, sir, we give up every thing as much as by direct taxation.

The same amount will be paid by the people as by direct taxes. If they be not efficacious, where is the advantage of this plan? In what respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences which we have experienced from requisitions? The power of laying direct taxes by the general government is supposed by the honorable gentleman to be chimerical and impracticable. What is the consequence of the alternative he proposes? We are to rely upon this power to be ultimately used as a penalty to compel the states to comply. If it be chimerical and impracticable in the first instance, it will be equally so when it will be exercised as a penalty. A reference was made to concurrent executions as an instance of the possibility of interference between the two governments.

[Here Mr. Madison spoke so low that he could not be distinctly heard.]

This has been experienced under the state governments without involving any inconvenience. But it may be answered that, under the state governments, concurrent exe-
vol. iii.39