Gov. RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, the general review which the gentleman has taken of the 9th section is so inconsistent, that, in order to answer him, I must, with jour permission, who are the custos of order here, depart from the rule of the house in some degree. I declared, some days ago, that I would give my suffrage for this Constitution, not because I considered it without blemish, but because the critical situation of our country demanded it. I invite those who think with me to vote for the Constitution. But where things occur in it which I disapprove of, I shall be candid in exposing my objections.
Permit me to return to that clause which is called by gentlemen the sweeping clause, I observed, yesterday, that I conceived the construction which had been put on this clause by the advocates of the Constitution was too narrow, and that the construction put upon it by the other party was extravagant. The immediate explanation appears to me most rational. The former contend that it gives no supplementary power, but only enables them to make laws to execute the delegated powers—or, in other words, that it only involves the powers incidental to those expressly delegated. By incidental powers they mean those which are necessary for the principal thing. That the incident is inseparable from the principal, is a maxim in the construction of laws. A constitution differs from a law; for a law only embraces one thing, but a constitution embraces a number of things, and is to have a more liberal construction. I need not recur to the constitutions of Europe for a precedent to direct my explication of this clause, because, in Europe, there is no constitution wholly in writing. The European constitutions sometimes consist in detached statutes or ordinances, sometimes they are on record, and sometimes they depend on immemorial tradition. The American constitutions are singular, and their construction ought to be liberal. On this principle, what should be said of the clause under consideration? (the sweeping clause.) If incidental powers be those only which are necessary for the principal thing, the clause would be superfluous.
Let us take an example of a single department; for instance, that of the President, who has certain things annexed to his office. Does it not reasonably follow that he must have some incidental powers? The principle of inci-
