though I conceive the subjects to be proper. It is ambiguous in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive in others. It extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution. What are these cases of law and equity? Do they not involve all rights, from an inchoate right to a complete right, arising from this Constitution? Notwithstanding the contempt gentlemen express for technical terms, I wish such were mentioned here. I would have thought it more safe, if it had been more clearly expressed. What do we mean by the words arising under the Constitution? What do they relate to? I conceive this to be very ambiguous. If my interpretation be right, the word arising will be carried so far that it will be made use of to aid and extend the federal jurisdiction.
As to controversies between the citizens of different states, I am sure the general government will make provision to prevent men being harassed to the federal court. But I do not see any absolute necessity for vesting it with jurisdiction in these cases.
With respect to that part which gives appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, I concur with the honorable gentleman who presides, that it is unfortunate, and my lamentation over it would be incessant, were there no remedy. I can see no reason for giving it jurisdiction with respect to fact as well as law; because we find, from our own experience, that appeals as to fact are not necessary. My objection would be unanswerable, were I not satisfied that it contains its own cure, in the following words: "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make." It was insisted on by gentlemen that these words could not extend to law and fact, and that they could not separate the fact from the law. This construction is irrational; for, if they cannot separate the law from the fact, and if the exceptions are prevented from applying to law and fact, these words would have no force at all. It would be proper to refer here to any thing that could be understood in the federal court. They may except generally both as to law and fact, or they may except as to the law only, or fact only. Under these impressions, I have no difficulty in saying that I consider it as an unfortunate clause. But when I thus impeach it, the same candor which I have hitherto followed calls upon me to declare that it is not so dangerous as
