free and independent, both on account of the officer and this house. I therefore conceive that it was never the intention of the Constitution to vest the power of removal in the President and Senate; but as it must exist somewhere, it rests on the President alone. I conceive this point was made fully to appear by the honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. Madison;) inasmuch as the President is the supreme executive officer of the United States.
It was asked if ever we knew a person removed from office by reason of sickness or ignorance. If there never was such a case, it is perhaps nevertheless proper that they should be removed for those reasons, and we shall do well to establish the principle.
Suppose your secretary of foreign affairs rendered incapable of thought or action by a paralytic stroke. I ask whether there would be any propriety in keeping such a person in office; and whether the salus populi—the first object of republican government — does not absolutely demand his dismission. Can it be expected that the President is responsible for an officer under these circumstances, although, when he went into office, he might have been a wise and virtuous man, and the President well inclined to risk his own reputation upon the integrity and abilities of the person?
I conceive it will be improper to leave the determination of this question to the judges. There will be some indelicacy in subjecting the executive action in this particular to a suit at law; and there may be much inconvenience if the President does not exercise this prerogative until it is decided by the courts of justice.
From these considerations, the safety of the people, the security of this house, and adherence to the spirit of the Constitution, I am disposed to think the clause proper; and as some doubts respecting the construction of the Constitution have arisen, I think it also necessary; therefore I hope it will remain.
Mr. SMITH, (of South Carolina.) The gentleman from Virginia has said that the power of removal is executive in its nature. I do not believe this to be the case. I have turned over the constitutions of most of the states, and I do not find that any of them have granted this power to the governor.—In some instances I find the executive magistrate suspends, but none of them have the right to remove, officers; and I take it that the Constitution of the United States has distributed the powers of government on the same principles which most of the state constitutions have adopted; for it will not be contended but the state governments furnished the members of the late Convention with the skeleton of this Constitution.
The gentlemen have observed that it would be dangerous if the President had not this power. But is there not danger in making your secretary of foreign affairs dependent upon the will and pleasure of the President? Can gentlemen see the danger on one side only? Suppose the President averse to a just and honorable war which Congress have embarked in; can he not countenance the secretary at war (for it is in contemplation to establish such an officer) in the waste of public stores, and misapplication of the supplies? Nay, cannot he dragoon your officer into a compliance with his designs by threatening him with a removal, by which his reputation and property would be destroyed? If the officer was established on a better tenure, he would dare to be honest he would know himself invulnerable in his integrity, and defy the shafts of malevo-
